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Mexican society is becoming militarized due to the increased use of the Mexican
military in domestic affairs. This militarization is the result of three factors: the internal
focus of the military, the drug war, and corruption. The internal focus of the Mexican
military is based on doctrine. Mexico's drug war began in 1986 when U.S. President
Reagan convinced their government that the trafficking of drugs constituted a national
security threat. Corruption is pervasive in Mexico due to the combination of seven
decades of authoritarian rule by the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and
the associated effects from transnational drug trafficking. The army represents the last
publicly respected institution in Mexico. During the past three years, almost the entire law
enforcement apparatus to combat drug trafficking has been replaced with military soldiers
and numerous key political appointees and governmental positions have been filled with
Mexican generals and colonels. There are few national interests more profoundly
consequential to the United States than the political stability and general welfare of
Mexico. The militarization and changing civil-military relations in Mexico is an important
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Mexican society is becoming militarized due to the increased use of the Mexican
military in domestic affairs. This militarization is the result of three factors: the internal
focus of the military, the drug war, and corruption. The internal focus of the Mexican
military is based on doctrine, which dates back to the Mexican Revolution and the laws
governing the army. Of four National Defense Plans, only the first one delineating the
defense of national territory is externally focused. However, the Mexican military focuses
the majority of its emphasis and resources on the remaining three defense plans. These
plans include defense against internal political threats, nation building civic action
programs, and using the military to fight the war on drugs.
The interdiction of illicit narcotics became a "drug war" in 1986 when President
Reagan convinced the Mexican government that the trafficking of drugs constituted a
national security threat. Corruption is pervasive in Mexico due to the combination of
seven decades of authoritarian rule by the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) and the associated effects from transnational drug trafficking. The army represents
the last publicly respected institution in Mexico. During the past three years, almost the
entire law enforcement apparatus to combat drug trafficking has been replaced with
military soldiers and numerous key political appointees and governmental positions have
been filled with Mexican generals and colonels. This thesis examines the current
militarization of Mexico in an era of ongoing political reform and liberalization. The
United States and Mexico experience an international relationship of complex
xi
interdependence. There are few national interests more profoundly consequential to the
United States than the political stability and general welfare of Mexico. Therefore, it is
important to study the militarization and changing civil-military relations of our neighbor
to the south in order to understand the implications to the United States and to




"Mexico's military, a long silent but essential partner in the autocratic political
system that has ruled Mexico for nearly seven decades, has assumed an increasingly visible
role while the country convulses through its most serious economic and political crises
since the 1910 revolution." 1 This statement raises many issues which one may wish to
question: What are these visible roles in which the Mexican military is now participating?
Are these roles new, and if so, are they part of an intended mission creep? What is the
relationship of the Mexican military with the political system?
An even more incisive question as it relates to understanding our neighbor to the
south is: Does this increased visibility of the military in Mexican society indicate a
growing military influence within that political system? This issue of influence is
important because it then helps to determine if this increased military visibility has a
stabilizing or destabilizing effect on what has been considered for decades to be one of the
most stable countries in Latin America. And, as Professor of National Security Affairs
Donald E. Schulz states, "the United States has few foreign policy concerns more
Dudley Althaus, "Mexicans Worried Greater Military Presence Crosses Political Lines,"
The Houston Chronicle. 28 July 1996, p. Al. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: APOLIT.
File: All. 12 August 1996.
profoundly consequential for its national interests - including its security interests - than
the political stability and general welfare ofMexico."2
It has been argued by numerous pundits that this military influence is the beginning
of the militarization of Mexican society. My argument in this thesis is that Mexico is
becoming militarized due to the increased use of the Mexican military, primarily the army,
in predominantly domestic affairs. This increased use of the military is the result of three
factors: the internal focus of the military, the drug war, and corruption.
The first factor, the internal focus of the Mexican military is primarily based on
doctrine. This dates back to the Mexican Revolution and the laws governing the army.
The Organic Law of 1926 stated that one of the missions of the army was to preserve
internal order. The army is currently tasked with four National Defense Plans, of which
only the first one delineating the defense of national territory, is externally focused.
However, the Mexican army focuses the majority of its emphasis and resources on the
remaining three defense plans. They include: defense against internal threats to the
government; assistance during times of natural disasters and nation building civic action
programs; and the most recent plan, which utilizes the army to fight the war on drugs.
The second factor, the interdiction of illicit narcotics became classified in 1986 as a
"drug war" when U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) linked the trafficking of
drugs to communist guerrillas. This was done not only to prevent the spread of
communism and the expansion of the "evil empire" as President Reagan called the Soviet
2
Donald E. Schulz, Mexico in Crisis (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
31 May 1995), p. Hi.
Union, but also to justify the use of United States military in stemming the flow of illicit
narcotics entering the country. Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988)
followed suit and for the first time in history, publicly acknowledged the drug issue as a
national security threat, thereby further involving the Mexican military in internal security
matters.
The final factor prompting the increased use of the Mexican military for domestic
affairs is corruption. Corruption is pervasive in Mexico due to the combination of seven
decades of authoritarian rule by the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI:
Partido Revolucionario Institutional) and the associated effects from transnational drug
trafficking. The army represents the last publicly respected institution in Mexico, and until
recently was perceived to be predominantly free of corruption.
Ongoing current events have necessitated this increased use of the army in
domestic affairs. These include two guerrilla insurgencies. The first began on New
Year's Day 1994, when the Zapatista National Liberation Forces (sometimes referred to
by their Spanish initials of EZLN), attacked the state capitol in Chiapas. The second
insurgency began during August 1996, when the Popular Revolutionary Army (commonly
referred to by their Spanish initials of EPR), conducted coordinated attacks in five central
states. Both insurgencies continue to this day. Mexican army troops have been
consistently deployed since January 1994 to combat these two threats to political stability.
Also, during the past three years, almost the entire law enforcement apparatus to combat
drug trafficking has been replaced with military soldiers and numerous key political
appointees and governmental positions have been filled with Mexican generals and
colonels.
The relationship between the United States and Mexico is one of complex
interdependence which revolves around multiple issues which are intertwined via a
network of multiple channels and in which military force is not deemed as appropriate to
solve disputes.
3
There are few inter-national interests more profoundly consequential to
the United States than the political stability and general welfare of Mexico. Therefore, it
is important to study the militarization and changing civil-military relations of our neighbor
to the south. It is important to understand the implications of these developments for the
United States in order to recommend possible policy changes.
The remainder of this chapter will present the thesis, central argument, its scope,
and the methodology to evaluate the thesis statement and to provide policy
recommendations. Chapter II will present a brief overview of civil-military relations
theory and how it relates to Mexico. Chapter III will describe the Mexican military.
Chapter IV presents three categories of indicators that demonstrate the increasing
militarization of Mexico. The final chapter will present conclusions and policy
recommendations.
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Glenview, LL:
Scott, Foresman, 1989) presents the international relations theory of complex
interdependence with chapter one providing a thorough description of the concept. For a
concise summary, see Jorge Chabat, "Mexican Foreign Policy in the 1990s," in Heraldo
Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin (editors), Latin American Nations in World Politics . 2nd ed.
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 151-152.
B. THESIS STATEMENT
Mexican society is becoming militarized due to the internal focus of the military;
increased participation of its military in the drug war; and the increased use of its military
to counteract corruption associated with the drug war and the hegemonic political system.
This militarization is changing civil-military relations in Mexico, which could have a
negative impact on the ongoing democratic liberalization of Mexico and in turn have
national security implications for the United States.
C. SCOPE
This thesis will examine the current use of the military in Mexico relative to an era
of ongoing political reform and liberalization. Military doctrine will be examined to
determine the prescribed roles and missions of the Mexican military and whether they lead
to militarization. Also, the use of the military to combat the drug war and to fill positions
vacated due to corruption will be examined for the same purpose.
D. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will present a single case study of the Mexican military, where internally
focused doctrine, the drug war, and corruption all contribute to the increased visibility of
the military in domestic affairs. It is hypothesized that this increase in militarism has a
correspondingly negative influence on the political stability ofMexico.
The Mexican military is becoming more visible because the number of its missions
are increasing, and military officers are currently filling more positions in society. This
thesis will present evidence to prove this militarization. It has become an everyday
occurrence to witness troops patrolling central and southern Mexican towns and
establishing road blocks to check for guerrillas and illicit narcotics. Army officers have
also recently been appointed to positions of local and national authority. These positions
include such postings as the chief of police in Mexico City and also as the commissioner of
the now defunct National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD). Increased visibility has thus
resulted due to the increased presence of troops and the citizens' perception of their
activities.
Historians and political scientists define militarism in numerous ways. For many it
is "the involvement of the military in the political life of the state."4 For others it entails
the government using the military for purposes other than defending the sovereignty of the
state against an external hostile force.
5
Yet for others it is simply an over-emphasis of the
importance of the military, allowing the military too much autonomy during times of crisis
or utilizing the armed forces in non-traditional roles and missions. 6 It is this last
interpretation of militarism that will be used in this thesis.
4
Carlos Guevara Mann, Panamanian Militarism: A Historical Interpretation (Athens, GA:
Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1996), p. xv.
See Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America, translated by Paul
Sigmund (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).
Augusto Varas, Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 27.
6
The influence of the military upon society will be defined not only as the power to
change the course of events, but also the extent to which those events have actually been
altered as a result of military intervention. This influence may be initiated by either the
direction of the government or by the military itself to circumvent the government. This is
the crux of the issue of Mexican political stability as determined by its civil-military
relations.
1. Hypothesis Testing Matrix
Table One depicts the thesis statement. In a single case study of the military in
Mexico, it demonstrates that the dependent variable of militarism is affected by the three
independent variables: internally-focused military doctrine, the drug war, and corruption.
The hypothesis is straightforward: an increase in any of the three independent variables
will cause a correspondent increase in the dependent variable.









Mexico Doctrine Drug War Corruption Militarism
2. Research
The vast majority of material for this thesis was obtained by conducting computer
online research utilizing various search engines to locate material on the World Wide Web,
Lexis-Nexis, and the United States Department of State-sponsored Foreign Broadcast
Information System (FBIS). Due to their search mechanisms and data bases, both Nexis
and FBIS provided hundreds ofjournal and newspaper articles which were read to provide
both background and also as cited material. To complement online sources, published
books, textbooks and research institution pamphlets were reviewed and cited as needed to
complete this study.
E. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Although the Mexican government in general and the Mexican military in
particular are rather secretive, there have been a number of excellent contributions to the
study of the Mexican military, with a major emphasis placed on the army for the obvious
reason that it constitutes 75 percent of the total forces. The seminal piece is Edwin
Lieuwen's Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army
1910-1940. This volume discusses how dictator General Porflrio Diaz transformed
numerous regional armed forces into a national army and provides a detailed history of the
army as it evolved throughout the 30 years of the revolution. The sequel to that excellent
historical piece is the dissertation completed by Stephen Wager, entitled The Mexican
7 Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Mexican Army
1910-1940 (Albuquerque, NM: The University ofNew Mexico Press, 1968).
8
Army, J940-1982: The Country Comes First? which extends the previous work by 42
years.
For a knowledgeable description of the personnel composition of the Mexican
military, their schooling and career paths, then Wager's contributions to Robert Wesson's
The Latin American Military Institution is enlightening. Two other volumes that are
mandatory for an understanding of the background of the Mexican army are Roderic
Camp's Generals in the Palacio and David Ronfeldt's The Modern Mexican Military: A
Reassessment.
To gain an understanding ofhow Mexico defines its national security priorities and
the related missions that its military performs, then two additional books should be
consulted. They include: Bruce Michael Bagley and Sergio Aguayo Quezada's Mexico:
In Search of Security and John Bailey and Sergio Aguayo Quezada's Strategy and
Security in U.S. -Mexican Relations Beyond the Cold War.
All authors agree that the modern Mexican military is a product of the revolution
and that the revolution is the defining agent for both the government and the military. The
military is an anomaly in many ways. In contrast to its Latin American counterparts, the
Mexican military has not attempted a coup or intervened in government in over fifty years.
It also defies civil-military relations theory in that an autonomous, professionalized force
remains apolitical while being co-opted by the hegemonic political party via what Samuel
Huntington calls subjective controls. What is not agreed upon is the future role the
Stephen J. Wager, The Mexican Army. 1940-1982: The Country Comes First
Ph.D. Dissertation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1992).
military will play in Mexican politics and society, especially following the current era of
democratic liberalization.
Compounding the uncertainties of this democratic liberalization which is being
instituted by President Zedillo is the simultaneous loss of hegemony by the PRI ruling
party. This thesis will demonstrate that the Mexican military is closely tied to the PRI and
that the government used the military to sustain the status quo, which for years has
provided political stability and relative peace. The fear is that the military will act to
ensure the continued existence of this PRI hegemony or worse, that the military will fill
the political vacuum if the PRI loses power. Hopefully, by looking at the civil-military
relations and history of the Mexican military and government, and then at the increased
militarization occurring today, policy makers can speculate how the Mexican military will
respond in the future, when it is no longer controlled by the PRI party.
10
II. THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
A. PRELUDE
To explain the changing distribution of political power among civilian and military
institutions in Mexico, it is useful to look at the extensive literature on traditional patterns
of civil-military relations. Existing analyses provide an historical and theoretical
perspective of how governments and militaries have shared power peacefully across
different types of political regimes (i.e., democracy, communism, totalitarianism,
authoritarianism), and why in some cases the military has chosen to intervene while in
others it has not. The literature on civil-military relations focuses on three broad areas:
the characteristics of the officer corps; assessments of military coup d'etats, military
regimes, and militarism; and policy proposals regarding the proper roles and missions for
militaries in the post cold war era. While some analyses attempt to offer a fail-safe recipe
or tool-box with which to study civil-military relations in numerous countries, this field is
an extremely complicated one and remains an inexact science. However, the literature
provides an introduction to the subject with which one can analyze contemporary
situations and apply to specific countries, such as Mexico.
B. THE OFFICER
Studies of civil-military relations have tended to focus on the officer corps as the
unit of analysis, starting with Samuel P. Huntington's seminal piece, The Soldier and the
11
State. In this 1957 book, he states that "The principal focus of civil-military relations is
the relation of the officer corps to the state"
5
Huntington develops the concept of the
"professional soldier," which has become widely accepted as a fundamental prerequisite
for stable civilian control of the military. To explain less stable civilian control, Amos
Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett offer two other concepts, the "praetorian soldier"
and the "professional revolutionary soldier."
1
Eric Nordlinger takes this analysis one step
further by sub-dividing praetorian soldiers into three further categories: the moderator, the
guardian, and the ruler. 11 This section looks carefully at these conceptualizations in order
to lay the theoretical framework for the empirical analyses that follow in this chapter.
1. The Professional Soldier
A fundamental assumption of this thesis is that variation in the character of the
officer corps explains variation in the nature of political participation of officers in their
respective political systems. The professional soldier belongs predominately to western
culture, to stable political systems with firm civilian control of the military. He has learned
to play by the rules and accepts the constraints placed upon his participation in governance
by the elected politicians and the legal system. The government is considered legitimate
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press,
1957), p. 3.
10 Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett, The Political Influence of the Military: A
Comparative Reader (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980).
Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977).
12
and is highly institutionalized. The professional soldier's proclivity is not to intervene in
the government but to attempt to influence national security policy via legal channels. A
good example of a country with professional soldiers is of course the United States, others
include Great Britain and France.
Huntington's prescription for healthy civil-military relations rests upon the concept
of professionalism within the officer corps. He states numerous reasons why greater
professionalism precludes military intervention into politics. First are the variables of
specialization and exclusiveness. Waging war has become highly technical and requires
specialized training. The professional soldier who exclusively trains to fight an external
aggressor will not have the time or skills to participate in other fields, especially politics.
Other considerations in the development of professionalism include scope and attitudes.
Professional military officers accept the distinction in role separation between themselves
and politicians and are indifferent to participating in politics. Professional military officers
therefore confine their activities to the military sphere and readily accept civilian control.
12
Policy formation in political systems that comprise professional soldiers needs to
consider the expertise and knowledge of the officer corps. They are the "managers of
violence" in their societies and best know how to wage war and project power. In
utilizing the military as an extension of politics to implement foreign policy abroad, the
12
For a lucid and succinct synopsis of Huntington's concept of professionalism, see Alfred
Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in
Alfred Stepan (editor), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins. Policies, and Future (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47-50. Unlike Huntington, Stepan argues that the
officer can be both professional and politicized (i.e., prone to intervene in politics) at the
same time.
13
elected officials must delineate exact parameters and expectations for their use. Politicians
need to respect the prerogatives of the military concerning input for procurement of
equipment, requirements for training, promotions, and budget items.
2. The Professional Revolutionary Soldier
Professional revolutionary soldiers are found mostly in countries that have political
systems that were forged as an outcome of a political revolution or in countries dominated
by a hegemonic party associated with a strong ideology. The obvious examples include
Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union; others to consider are Israel and Mexico. The key
determinant of professional revolutionary soldiers is their ideological link to the
government. In most cases, the government and a new military were formed nearly
simultaneously as a result of either revolution or the formation of a new state. The
revolutionary mystique or single ideology is the foundation and glue that not only gives
substance to both institutions but also bonds them together. These institutions of the
military and government are independent but co-equal. They rely on one another to
provide legitimacy to each other.
Policy considerations for the newly formed, post-revolutionary government
immediately generate tensions. Revolutions do not last forever, eventually the
revolutionary mystique will fade and along with it goes the bond between the military and
the government. The military may view the government as no longer possessing
legitimacy and may be inclined to intervene.
14
Another policy consideration is the professionalization and depoliticization of the
military. Both can lead to animosity of the military towards the civilian government,
especially during transitions. As the military is depoliticized it loses its ability to influence
policy. The military should be professionalized simultaneously with this loss of political
clout but that usually entails modernization, which governments may not be able to afford.
A major prerogative of the military is its budget and equipment. Militaries that perceive
resources to be inadequate are often inclined to intervene or participate in government
until their requests are satisfied.
3. The Praetorian Soldier
Praetorian soldiers are found in highly politicized societies that have poorly
institutionalized political systems. The soldiers as well as other organized segments of
society are politically motivated to intervene in politics. In these situations, the
government is widely perceived as weak and inadequate in its performance of serving its
citizens. Perlmutter refers to this as "regime vulnerability." 13 The government loses its
legitimacy to run the country and the praetorian soldier feels obligated to intervene.
In his analysis of military coups, Nordlinger sub-divides praetorian soldiers into
three categories based upon their level of intervention and extent of their objectives. 14
"Praetorian moderators" are the least ambitious of potential military rulers. They maintain
veto power over the civilian government in order to sustain the status quo or balance of
13 Perlmutter and Bennett, op. cit
. p. 15.
14 Nordlinger, op. cit .. pp. 21-29.
15
power between the military and civilian elites. "Praetorian guardians" overthrow the
civilian government to correct deficiencies with their rule and then return power to
civilians, usually after only two to four years. "Praetorian rulers" not only control the
government but also dominate the regime and sometimes large sectors of society.
Numerous countries throughout the world, predominately in Latin America, Asia,
and Africa, are characterized as praetorian. Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Sumatra, Malaysia,
and Egypt have all experienced military intervention of their governments. The military
viewed their governments as illegitimate due to being disorganized and unresponsive to
the citizenry. The military viewed themselves as cohesive and better suited to govern.
Often, the military represented the only sector of society that was capable of ruling
effectively.
15
Frequently, the civilians agreed with the military and invited their
intervention. Unfortunately, military governments have tended to be repressive and
authoritarian. They have attempted to create new governmental structures and ideology
which they are not capable of sustaining and/or institutionalizing. 16
The obvious policy recommendation for these countries is not to allow the military
to be involved in politics. Depoliticizing the military and different segments of society as
well as establishing clear and strict parameters for military participation in politics and
policy formation would be the favored solution. Unfortunately, praetorian militaries arise
Lucien Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson
(editor), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries . (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1962).
16
Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone . (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
16
because poorly instituted governments do not have the resolve, capability, or resources to
sustain civilian control. Weak states can appeal to the United States or United Nations for
recognition and support. Military intervention into politics usually results from a
perception of civilian weakness. If external actors bolster the strength of the internal
government then the perceived need for military intervention may not prevail.
Professional militaries are also less apt to intervene. Applying for external military aid to
modernize, educate, and train the military may also retard the possibility of military
intervention.
There is not a clear recipe to ensure that the military does not intervene in the
government of a given country. Military officers from all countries exert political
influence and participate in the formation of policy to some extent. The Western cultural
goal is to establish a highly institutionalized political system that both represents and
serves its citizenry. An autonomous, professional military is less apt to intervene in a
government that is socially cohesive and generally perceived to be legitimate.
C. CIVIL-MILITARY POLITICAL SYSTEMS
The predominant belief in Western culture is that civilian control of both the
government and the military is the only acceptable system of governance. However, most
political theorists state that all militaries exert political influence. Perlmutter specifically
states that "the modern military officer is oriented toward maximizing his influence in
politics and/or policy." 17 Therefore, the lesson for leaders of different political systems is
1
"7
Perlmutter and Bennett, op. cit.
. p. 5.
17
to learn how to harness the beneficial influence and expertise of their military elites. This
needs to be accomplished without allowing that influence to become pervasive or to create
an environment that invites the military to intervene in politics or take over the governance
of the country. It also must not create rifts between military and civilian elites so severe
that the military cannot defend the country properly.
The relationship between civilian control of the military and government, and
military control of the government is not a dichotomous relationship. According to
Claude Welch, civilian control is a matter of degree. "A continuum of relationships exists
between the power of the military and the power of civilian institutions relative to the
enunciation, development, and implementation of policy." 18 Scholars consider civilian
control of the government with military input into national security policy formation as the
norm. In other instances, civil-military relations is characterized by military participation
in civilian led governments and difFering varieties of military controlled government.
Military political action can be divided into three broad categories: civilian rule,
praetorianism, and military rule. 19 Under civilian rule, military missions may range from
strictly external defense to internal support of the government and influence may range
from nil to considerable in terms of developing national security policy. However, the key
point is that the military is subordinate to the civilian decision makers. A praetorian
Claude E. Welch, Jr., Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from
Developing Countries (Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press, 1976).
Frank L. Wilson, Concepts and Issues in Comparative Politics: An Introduction to
Comparative Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996).
18
political system is one where the military remains formally out of governance but exerts
tremendous influence via veto power, extortion, or threats to intervene. The highest level
of military involvement is when the military seizes power and rules the government.
Different scholars provide different theories as to how to ensure civilian control of
the military and government. One of the most cited and controversial is Huntington's
theory of objective versus subjective civilian control, first introduced in 1957. 20 The
normative premise behind objective control is to isolate the military from the political
sphere of society by forming an autonomous military sphere. This is accomplished by
professionalizing the military and limiting their missions to strictly external defense of the
nation. The civilian government must refrain from interfering in internal military affairs
and the military must accept subordination to the civilian government and therefore never
intervene. In essence, the military is militarized so that government and civilians are not.
The end result is that the political power of the military is so severely limited that they are
preempted from intervening in government.
Subjective civilian control is the antithesis of objective control. Instead of
militarizing the military and having them stand apart from the rest of society, they are
civilianized and integrated into society. Subjective control attempts to maximize the
political power of the government by marginalizing the influence of other sectors of
society, including the military. The goal is to deny the existence of a military entity.
Governments using subjective control of their militaries have been criticized for directing
20
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the militaries towards internal threats to sustain the status quo of the prevailing
government's power base. This politicizes the military and creates the potential for future
political intervention.
Morris Janowitz disagrees with Huntington's notion that civil-military relations fall
on a bi-polar scale anchored by subjective and objective control. The main difference may
be that Huntington attempts to describe ideal types and relationships whereas Janowitz
attempts to be more realistic. He sees the pragmatically professional military force acting
as a constabulary force, intertwined into civilian society and conducting missions that are
both agreeable to the government and socially accepted. 21
Alfred Stepan updates the concept of professionalism to reflect the actual missions
Latin American militaries have conducted since the 1950s. Stepan states that
Huntington's theory of "old professionalism" was based on the assumption that armies
train to fight wars against external aggressors. However, since Huntington published his
theory, most Latin American militaries have been focused to combat an internal threat.
This focus on internal threat is the basis for Stepan's theory of"new professionalism.""
Under the old concept of a professional military officer, the officers' function was
to combat an external aggressor. In contrast, the newly conceptualized professional is
Morns Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, EL.
The Free Press, 1960). For a contrast and comparison of Janowitz and Huntington, see
Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the
Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces and Society
.
Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1996),
149-178.
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oriented towards an internal security threat, often an insurgency that challenges the
legitimacy of the government. Since the threat is politically motivated, the military is
forced to educate and train itself to interpret this political threat. This new
professionalization results in the officer becoming politicized. Since the original threat
was based on a challenge to the legitimacy of the government, it portrays a political
system that is perceived to be weakly institutionalized. The new professional military
officer, with his newly acquired political skills, may now feel justified to intervene in
politics.
Although political scientists continue to debate the civil-military relations' theories
of Huntington, Janowitz and Stepan and which is best suited for a particular country,
Stepan's theory of new professionalism introduces another concept which will be
discussed in the next section. In addition to being focused on internal security, the new
professional is also tasked with development of the nation. Stepan states that this
inevitably leads to role expansion, which is a concern of governments when assigning roles
and missions to their militaries.
D. ROLES AND MISSIONS
Civil-military relations in its simplest form is about the relationship between a
government and its military. The relationship will vary depending at what level their
agreements and disagreements are found. Fundamentally, all tensions arise from the issue
of which institution controls the other. A higher level of concession would be an
21
agreement as to the amount of influence each institution has upon the other. A higher
level yet would be an agreement on a division of labor.
Healthy civil-military relations are enhanced by this division of labor. A
professional military accepts its subordination to civilian control and in turn is granted the
authority and autonomy by that government to conduct its mission with minimal
interference. This appears to be one concept that most theorists agree upon and originates
with On War by Karl von Clausewitz. 23 He stated that war was an extension of politics
and even though military operations were subordinate to political diplomacy they were still
the exclusive province of the military.
How governments perceive threats will determine the roles and missions that a
given military is tasked to conduct. Roles and missions in turn have a significant impact
upon the civil-military relations of the country. Roles and missions delineate military tasks
based upon the nature of the threat, whether it is military or non-military, and also from
where the threat is originating, either external or internal. Military missions can be
identified by reviewing the official doctrine, which has been described as "the software
that runs the military hardware."24
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Huntington ties the civil-military political system and roles and missions together.
Countries facing an external threat and orienting the missions of their military to confront
this threat typically adopt objective control mechanisms and are also most likely to
experience healthy civil-military relations. In contrast, governments facing numerous
internal threats often have weak political institutions, utilize subjective control measures
and may suffer from unhealthy civil-military relations. 25
The historical and primary external mission for all militaries is to fight wars against
an external aggressor force. More modern external missions include international
peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Internal and non-traditional missions include
anti-narcotics operations, counterterrorism, riot control, disaster relief, civic action, and
social-welfare operations. All missions other than fighting wars have elicited controversy
as to whether they detract from the one primary external mission or the readiness to
conduct that mission. A major fear is that internally focused missions tend to politicize the
military and open the door to future political intervention.
In numerous developing countries, the military represents the most organized,
capable and trusted institution within that country. Often the nation's budget cannot
afford to establish supplementary institutions to conduct operations other than war.
Confronted with these budgetary constraints, the civilian led government needs to ask
three questions: Do these non-traditional missions detract from the military's ability to




military in domestic politics? Does the mission enhance or detract the consolidation of
democracy within that country?
Attempting to apply civil-military relations theory to a particular country is a bit
like trying to hit a moving target. This is especially true when the country is Mexico. The
next section will briefly describe the civil-military relations of Mexico which combined
with the history of the Mexican military in Chapter III will present an accurate picture of
how those relations evolved.
E. MEXICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Like many other aspects of politics in Mexico, civil-military relations is an
anomaly, when placed in comparative perspective. Atypical for a Latin American country,
civilians dominate politics and there hasn't been a coup since 1920. The military is
considered autonomous regarding its education, training, and promotion, and is also
perceived as secretive. The official doctrine for the military emphasizes internal missions
and the government maintains strict civilian dominance utilizing subjective control
mechanisms. Yet, most importantly, the military officer in Mexico is considered extremely
professional.
27
It is this professionalism which is most often cited as the explanation for why the
Mexican army has not intervened in the government for the past seventy years. Scholars
Louis W. Goodman, "Military Role Past and Present," in Diamond and Plattner,
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argue that the Mexican officer has considered his highly institutionalized government as
legitimate and has been willing to play by the rules and accepts the constraints placed upon
his political participation by that government. 28 The dominant belief has been that the
nation is more important than the individual and that civilians are above the military. This
degree of professionalization has ensured that the fear of military intervention in Mexican
politics was minimized due to the general acceptance of civilian control of the military.
Where the Mexican military deviates from Huntington's description of professional
soldiers is its mission orientation. Rather than being specialized in waging war against an
external aggressor and exclusively training to conduct war fighting, it is focused on
internal political threats and is tasked with law enforcement, bureaucratic administration,
social work, and nation building development projects. This internal orientation violates
Huntington's theory of objective control. Observers of Mexican politics fear that this
increased military presence in civil society will allow the Mexican military an inroad to
intervene in politics.
As the next chapter will describe, the origin of the modern Mexican military was
the revolution. The revolution produced an officer who could have been classified as what
scholars would label a "professional revolutionary soldier" with an ideological tie to the
emergent government. The chapter will then explain how the political leaders using co-
optation and political party-building were able to successfully depoliticize the officer corps
and convert those revolutionary soldiers into professional soldiers.
28
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III. THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY
A. PRELUDE
Having just outlined the prevailing theories of civil-military relations and a brief
description of the Mexican situation, this chapter will present more thoroughly the history
of the Mexican military as it has evolved since the revolution. Before a narrative of this
history, it is important to describe the political atmosphere in which the military operates
in Mexico.
B. CURRENT POLITICAL SETTING
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully classify Mexico as a hegemonic system in
which a single party is in total control, and sustains that control via unfair elections. In
their description of political party systems, they state that Mexico is somewhere between
institutionalized and inchoate. 29 The editors also describe the different types of political
parties and their importance in different Latin American countries. A political party
system allows for competition and patterned interaction between different parties. An
institutionalized party system exists when the processes or organizations become well
established and widely known, if not universally accepted. Four conditions must be
29
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satisfied for a party system to be institutionalized: there must be stability in the rules, the
major parties must have somewhat stable roots in society, major political actors must
accord legitimacy to the electoral system by adhering to the outcome of sanctioned
elections, and finally, party organizations must have an identity of their own and not be
subordinate to individual persons. Inchoate refers to a weakly institutionalized party
system that hasn't completely satisfied the above four conditions.
Three other well known Latin Americanists classify Mexico slightly higher on the
democracy continuum. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset state that
Mexico has historically been hegemonic but due to recent political reforms during the past
two presidential terms, they now call Mexico semi-democratic. 30 According to the three
authors, a semi-democracy either restricts party competition or elections are so unfair that
electoral outcomes do not produce true popular sovereignty and accountability. Either
way, none of these five experts would pronounce Mexico to be an unqualifiedly
democratic system, even though the current regime was designed with that intent.
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 that was developed during the Mexican
Revolution prescribed a presidential system of government. In theory, the government is
composed of three autonomous branches: the executive, a bicameral federal legislature,
and a judiciary. Patterned after the United States constitution, it empowers each branch
with the capacity to check and balance the others. In reality, Mexico has an authoritarian
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes
for Democracy?" in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (editors),
Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. 2nd ed.
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), pp. 7-8.
28
system characterized by a highly centralized state with a strong presidency that dominates
the system at all levels.
31 The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI: Partido
Revolucionario Institutional), having undergone a couple of name changes, has won
every presidential election since it was first created in 1929. The party has been controlled
by the country's president during every sexenio (six year elected presidential term) up until
the most recent presidential election held in 1994. The party receives funding from the
government and for the majority of the past seven decades, it has been extremely difficult
to distinguish any separation between this political party and government. This lack of
separation is so evident that Mexican journalists equate the party with the state in the
word Pri-gobierno (the PRI/government). 32 This single party dominated political system
is a classic example of a hegemonic party system as defined by Mainwaring and Scully.
The PRI has never lost a national election and until 1989 when the governorship of
Baja California state was won by the National Action Party (PAN: Partido de Action
National), it had never lost a local election. Nearly every national and local election held
in Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s has been considered fraudulent, with reported
destruction of thousands of ballots for PRI opponents, early closing of polls, improperly
color-coded ballots for illiterate voters, and the ongoing custom of incumbent presidents
31 Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius, "Houses Divided: Parties and Political Reform in
Mexico," in Mainwaring and Scully, op. cit
. p. 251. See also Samuel P. Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
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Reelection to consecutive terms is prohibited by the
constitution. As tainted as this government is, this monopoly of power is sometimes
considered a valuable asset. PRI supporters compare Mexico to the rest of Latin America
with its sordid history of coups and military governments. The Mexican system even with
all of its faults, they state, has at least guaranteed stability.
34
Mexico's post-revolutionary political stability is in great part due to the loyal
behavior of the military. Ever since the creation of the PRI, the military has remained
under civilian control. This subordination of the military to the politicians has helped to
strengthen the ruling party.
35 One reason for the close tie between the military and the
government is that both were developed as a result of the revolution and therefore share a
similar ideological foundation.
C. CREATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY
Historically, a national army in Mexico dates back to the 15th century and the
Aztec warriors. Prior to the arrival of Columbus to the New World, the Triple Alliance
formed by three Aztec city states was able to field an army of 18,000 troops. However,
these forces were easily decimated by the Spanish conquistador, Hernan Cortes, and his
33 Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas. Stockbrokers, Politicians, and
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outnumbered troops due to their use of firearms, shock troops mounted on horseback, and
the introduction of new diseases from Europe. Military remnants from 300 years of
Spanish domination include the adoption of Spanish military ranks, prestige associated
with cavalry units, and a sharp division between officers and enlisted personnel. 36
The army during the years of independence was a compilation of numerous,
regional forces led by powerful, charismatic leaders known as caudillos. General Porfirio
Diaz, who led Mexico as a dictator from 1876 until 1911, is credited with reining in all of
the provincial military chieftains and uniting them into one national army under the
command of the central government. It took him nearly fifteen years to accomplish this
task. Those chieftains that were weaker were defeated in battle, some were subjected to
corruption and were paid large salaries, while others were either promoted to political
positions or sent overseas as military attaches. In all, Diaz was able to remove or
subjugate over five hundred officers, including twenty-five of one hundred generals. 37
Diaz was a ruthless dictator, who provided few benefits to his countrymen. He
used the army to maintain internal peace rather than as a deterrent to external aggressors.
The military provided the stability to promote economic growth, and in turn, that growth
provided the funding to maintain the army. To professionalize the army, and consequently
remove it from the political arena, the army was reduced in size from between sixty
thousand to ninety thousand down to fewer than thirty thousand. The government also
36
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purchased the army new equipment consisting of used rifles and cannons from France,
Germany, and the United States. The Chapultepec Military Academy was founded during
the 1880s to turn men from good families into presentable, professional officers.
Although the Mexican army appeared well organized to the outside observer at the
turn of the century, it actually contained serious faults. The curriculum at the academy
stressed foreign languages and European battle strategy, subjects not needed for an
internally focused military of an underdeveloped nation. Of even greater concern, this ill
directed education was only possessed by the younger officers. The generals were mostly
old, uneducated, and nonprofessional soldiers, many of whom were corrupt. Most
importantly, the composition of the army consisted of nearly nine thousand officers and
only eighteen thousand troops, most ofwhom were vagrants, beggars, or criminals.
In 1910, after Diaz had once again declared himself the victor in a fraudulent
presidential election, Francisco Madero, his opponent, created the Army of Liberation. In
the spring of 191 1, Madero 's forces were joined by others led by regional strongmen such
as Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa. Upon the resignation of Diaz in May 1911, many of
the soldiers from the Liberation Army joined the federates of the National Army, which
was led by General Victoriano Huerta. However, once Madero assumed the presidency
(1911-1913), he failed to implement the social reform desired by both Zapata and Villa.
These regional forces therefore continued the military phase of the Mexican Revolution
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During this time frame, Venustiano Carranza, leader of the Northern faction, called
the military leaders of the other factions to a constitutional convention to draft a new
supreme law for the Republic of Mexico. The resultant Constitution of 1917 is the
bedrock of both the current Mexican government and military. It provided both with
legitimacy and a common ideology. From this revolution and constitution a single national
army emerged.
Stephen Wager, one of leading experts on the Mexican army, argues in his
dissertation that the primary reason that the army has remained apolitical in Mexico is due
to the ideology that developed during the revolution. This ideology is composed of six
elements: revolutionary heritage, institutional loyalty, discipline, patriotism, nationalism,
and apoliticism. 40 To this day, the military academy is the primary method of
institutionalizing professionalism and ideology in officers in Mexico. The process has two
functions: to inculcate norms and values and also to teach necessary military skills while
restricting political knowledge. * These ideals are then reinforced throughout the officers'
careers at subsequent senior war colleges. The end result is that Mexican officers view
themselves as guardians of the revolution, which eschews military intervention in politics
in favor of assisting the nation develop.
40
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D. POST-REVOLUTION PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE ARMY
During the warring years, as a result of combining regional forces with the
remnants of the national army, the total forces numbered over two hundred thousand with
fifty thousand officers of which some five hundred claimed to be generals. President-elect
Carranza (1917-1920) assigned the task of dissolving the Constitutionalist Army and
creating a smaller national army to his Minister of War, General Alvaro Obregon. He
created the Legion of Honor of the National Army, which allowed officers to retain their
rank and still receive full pay for volunteering to remove themselves from active duty.
Those that did not leave voluntarily were reviewed and many were sent to the reserves at
half pay.
42
Due to disagreements with Carranza, Obregon himself resigned and returned to
civilian life. Carranza continued to reorganize the military but made little effect. Most
telling of his failed progress was the military budget. Before Carranza assumed office, the
army received 31 percent of the government's budget. During the first year of his
presidency, the army received an all time high of 72 percent of the national budget. In the








Obregon (1920-1924) succeeded Carranza as president and immediately set out to
reorganize and professionalize the military. He further reduced the now one hundred
thousand man army by 50 percent and reduced its share of the national budget to 36
percent.
44 He revamped the curriculum at the War College and sent promising young
officers overseas to learn modern military techniques. He had regulation uniforms issued
to all troops and required that they wear them. Finally, to help depoliticize the military, he
forbade all members from participating in any political activity and kept them busy by
assigning them to conduct civic action, such as repairing railroads and constructing roads
and irrigation systems. Civic action became the mainstay of the Mexican army and also
provided a means for the military to satisfy their revolutionary commitments by helping to
develop the economic well being of the country.
As is common in Mexico, Obregon hand-picked his successor. General Plutarco
Elias Calles (1924-1928) continued his predecessor's efforts to depoliticize the military
and gain control of the government. Calles purged the army of numerous politically
aspirant generals, thus enhancing the power of the president at the expense of the generals.
Calles should also be given credit for changes made to the military due his selection of
General Joaquin Amaro as his Minister of War. A hero from the Revolution, Amaro
further reduced the military budget by placing a moratorium on promotions and reducing
the number of soldiers on active duty. He was a stern disciplinarian and this in turn
enhanced the pride and performance of his service. He saw the military as the defender of
44
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the people and set out to create a military education system that would take a common
citizen and turn him into a professional officer. Due to his dedicated work on the school
system and the laws governing the military, he is considered the architect of the modern
Mexican military.
After leaving office in 1929, President Calles founded the Party of the National
Revolution (PNR: Partido National Revolutionaries), a political party that co-opted
different segments of Mexican society into a corporatist state. The military was purposely
omitted from the party since Calles thought the political sectors of labor, peasants, and
bureaucrats would offset their influence. This was referred to by Huntington as "the most
striking example of political institution building by generals."46 During this period there
was little distinction between the government and the military. Every president since
Porfirio Diaz, who began his reign in 1876, until 1946 ascended the Army's ladder to the
rank of General prior to assuming the presidency. 47
President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940), himself previously an army general,
reorganized the ruling party in 1938 as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM:
Partido de la Revolution Mexicana), and incorporated the military as the fourth pillar. 48
"Thus, paradoxically, the military were politicized in order to demilitarize politics and to
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neutralize the military by involving them politically in a subordinate way."49 The influence
of the military was severely diminished considering that the military only constituted
55,000 of 3.8 million party members. This securely placed the military under the control
of the civilian led government.
For the next two years the military was still officially recognized as a corporate
pillar of the party, but in 1940 its pillar status was eliminated, although many argue that it
remains a silent partner until this day. It was at this time that the civilian controlled
government, in order to further distance the army from the political arena, incorporated
strict military doctrine to establish parameters on their missions. Doctrine will be
thoroughly analyzed as one of the independent variables in Chapter IV.
The modern Mexican military that exists today was thus fundamentally formed
during the twenty year period following the revolution. Due to the leadership of
successive generals turned president, the military became smaller, more tightly controlled,
educated, and professionalized. This resulted in the acceptance of civilian control of the
military which enabled civilians to become presidents without prior military service. The
fact that Presidents Calles and Cardenas, both having previously obtained the rank of
general, were responsible for creating the political party that today is the PRI also is
considered as a cause for the special relationship that exists between the ruling party and
49
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the military. Some observers of Mexican civil-military relations have even referred to the
military as the "armed wing of the government."
50
E. THE MODERN MEXICAN MILITARY
1. Organizational Structure
The modern Mexican military is divided into the Secretariat of National Defense,
which controls both the army and the air force, and the Secretariat of the Navy. Ministers
for both secretariats (SECDEF and SECNAV) are active duty, uniformed flag officers
who are members of the president's cabinet. Due to the Mexican characteristic of
personalismo, where personal loyalty and relationships are more important than
competence, each new president personally selects his two ministers, who in turn select
zone commanders that are considered loyal to them and the president. All senior officers
then select their staffs and subordinate commanders. This means of selecting officers for
key positions is similar to the camarilla system in Mexican politics. 51 Decision making
throughout the military is highly centralized and command follows a rigid hierarchy. 52
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The army is composed primarily of two types of combat units: infantry and
cavalry. During the modernization that took place during the 1970s most cavalry units
replaced their horses with motorized vehicles. Rather than being organized by combat
divisions as is the United States, the Mexican army allocates their forces according to
geographical zones.
In 1988, Mexico was divided into thirty-five zones. Today, Mexico has thirty-nine
military zones; one for each of the thirty-one states plus the Federal District. States that
are either geographically larger or more strategically significant, such as Guerrero with the
EPR insurgency and Tabasco with its wealth of natural resources, are subdivided into two
zones. Chiapas with the ongoing Zapatista insurgency has gone from one zone in the early
1990s to three zones in 1997. This is a clear indicator of the ongoing militarization of that
state. Administratively, the zones are grouped into twelve military regions, with the senior
zone commander in each region acting as the regional commander. The navy is similarly
subdivided into seventeen naval zones, one for each coastal state; eleven on the Pacific
coast and six in the Gulf of Mexico. The air force is dispersed among various airfields
throughout the country with the majority of personnel and aircraft being in close proximity
to the capital city.
Zone commanders are selected by the SECDEF and SECNAV in close
coordination with the president. All forces in their geographical area fall under their
purview, including the reserves and Rural Defense Corps. Duties as the senior military
commander include maintaining the political stability in their area and also conducting the
39
civic action projects. The zone commanders provide a direct intelligence link between the
states and the central government and provide a feedback mechanism for the populace to
communicate to the government. They play a prominent role, both socially and politically,
in governing the state. Many times during the past seventy years during periods of
political instability, zone commanders have replaced the elected governors by order of the
president.
53 Zone commanders are rotated to different geographical areas, usually every
three years, to prevent them and their staff from developing too strong political
connections in a particular area, and thereby possibly presenting an internal threat to
national political stability.
2. Personnel
As Table Two shows and according to published sources, total active forces
include approximately 175,000 personnel. Of this number, 130,000 are in the army,
37,000 in the navy, and 8,000 in the air force.
54 The army also has 300,000 reservists and
another 14,000 paramilitary members as part of the Rural Defense Corps. 55 Numerous
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Mexican journalists report that actual active duty forces may number as many as 235,000,
but this has not been confirmed by either the Mexican government or published sources. 56
The biggest increases allegedly began in 1994, soon after the Zapastista uprising. Another
reason for the unannounced buildup is to provide more troops to combat the drug war and
corruption, as will be discussed in Chapter IV.
Table 2: Size of the Mexican Military in Proportion to Population
Year Personnel Population (mil) Ratio (per 1,000)
1940 50,000 19.6 2.55
1950 50,000 25.7 1.95
1960 55,000 34.2 1.61
1970 64,000 52.0 1.23
1980 100,000 69.2 1.45
1990 141,500 84.3 1.68
1995 175,000 92.2 1.90
Source: Wager, 1992, Ph.D. dissertation and IISS, The Military Balance57
Active duty members are volunteers who serve a three year enlistment in the same
geographical area in which their family resides and where they entered the service. The
issued rifles from the army but receive no other pay or compensation. An active duty
army officer is assigned to organize and train these local units. Operationally, both the
NMS and the RDC report to the zone commander. See Stephen J. Wager, "Mexico," in
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majority of enlisted personnel come from lower class neighborhoods and join the military
as a means to gain upward social movement. Those that reenlist usually become non-
commissioned officers (NCO), are called sergeants and remain on active duty until eligible
to retire.
Officer candidates come from mostly middle class families and also join the military
to move up socially. Acceptance into one of the service academies ensures a four year
college education, a secure career with good pay, and fringe benefits. About 95 percent of
all officers begin as cadets at one of the service academies. The remaining 5 percent come
from superior performing NCO's who have been sent to the War College for a special one
year program. Officers with the potential to get promoted beyond Major are sent to the
Superior War College (ESG: Escuela Superior de Guerra) for three years sometime
during their first ten years of active duty and are designated as general staff officers
(DEM: diplomados de estado mayor). Those graduates then compete for selection to the
National War College (Colegio de Defensa), which is a stepping stone to making General.
The National War College is the first point in an officer's career where they are authorized
to study political topics and national security policy. 58
3. The Defense Budget
Similar to civil-military relations in Mexico, the defense budget and its relation to
the country's socio-economic status is a list of seemingly inconsistent facts. One of the
most obvious inconsistencies is the change in defense spending, especially in comparison
58
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with the total governmental budget for Mexico. According to historian E. Bradford
Burns, prior to the revolution, as the most institutionalized sector of Mexican society, the
army actually consumed a greater share of the national budget than did the rest of the
government during the reign of General Porfirio Diaz. 59 In 1914, at the beginning of the
Revolution, the army's budget was 44 million pesos, which represented 31 percent of the
141 million peso governmental budget. Three years later during the peak of fighting
between Carranza's National Army and the forces mounted by Pancho Villa and Emiliano
Zapata, the army's budget consumed 72 percent of the total budget. Five years later, in
1922 when the military phase of the Revolution was complete, the army's budget was 41
percent of the total governmental budget and steadily decreased a couple of percentage
points every year for the next thirty years. By the mid 1950s, the military budget (the
navy was included in 1944) represented less than 10 percent of the national government's
annual budget.
60 The declining budget of the 1940s and early 1950s is a pretty clear
indication of the demilitarization of Mexican politics and the de-emphasis of the military
during this time frame.
Just as it is difficult to find accurate numbers of military personnel, it is just as hard
to find accurate data on Mexican defense expenditures. The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, which annually publishes data on all militaries of the world, specifically
lists Mexico as one of the most secretive countries. It states that Mexico spent 16.6
19
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billion new pesos (US$ 3.0 billion) on defense in 1996. This represents 0.6 percent of the
country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although Mexico spends a relatively small
amount of its GDP on defense, what is more revealing, as Table Three indicates, is the
obvious increases in defense spending.
Table 3: Mexican Defense Expenditures
Year Defense Expenditures










Source: IISS, The Military Balance : 1979-1996
What is not revealed in Table Three is that in 1993, Mexico only allocated US$ 1.6
billion to the 1994 defense budget, but actual defense expenditures amounted to US $2.3
billion. This increase in spending corresponds to the military mobilization to combat the
Zapatista insurgency in the state of Chiapas. The other obvious increase in defense
spending is the jump from US$ 0.71 billion in 1990 to US$ 1.52 billion in 1992. This
dramatic increase corresponds to the militarization of the "drug war."61
Although this chapter has been primarily descriptive in content, there are some
major points that definitely indicate the growing militarization of Mexico. The increase in
The Military Balance 1996/97 . op. cit.
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the number of military zones is indicative of the administrative and operational burden
placed upon the government of Mexico to combat the two ongoing guerrilla insurgencies.
Creating new commands, building installations and shifting military assets does provide
evidence that Mexico is militarizing particular states and "hot spots." Also, using the zone
commanders to replace elected officials and as an intelligence link back to the central
government reveals why some refer to the military as the "armed wing of the
government."
Although the huge military personnel increases reported by some of the Mexican
journalists has not been substantiated by official governmental reports, the overall trend of
the size of the military as shown in Table Two indicates an increase irrelative to population
growth. Just looking at the data from 1979 until 1995 shows that the population did not
even double, however the number of military personnel nearly tripled. Finally, the huge
increase in the defense budget clearly indicates the emphasis that the Mexican government
has placed on combating both the "drug war" and the two guerrilla insurgencies. The next
chapter will address specifically the indicators of this increased militarization of Mexico.
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IV. INDICATORS OF THE INCREASING MILITARIZATION OF
MEXICO
A. PRELUDE
As introduced in the first chapter, the hypothesis of this thesis is that Mexico is
becoming increasingly militarized. This militarization is due to the expanded roles of the
military in accordance with an internally focused doctrine, the escalation of the "drug
war," and increases in political corruption. This chapter will present evidence to
substantiate these claiams. As argued in the thesis statement, an increase in militarization
alters the civil-military relations between the government and military in Mexico. How
that changing relationship may affect the ongoing democratic liberalization will be
analyzed in the concluding chapter.
B. DOCTRINAL FOCUS
The constitution of 1917 provides for a national army and clearly states that the
president is the civilian commander in chief with strong executive power to control the
actions of the military. 62 During the presidential term of Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-
1928), Minister ofWar General Amaro founded the Technical Commission to rewrite the
laws governing the military. The Organic Law of 1926 provides the military's legal raison
62 Wager, 1992, op. cit .. p. 370.
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d'etre, stating that the mission of the army is "to defend the integrity and independence of
the fatherland, to maintain the rule of the constitution and its laws, and to conserve
internal order."
63
The law was modified in 1971, eliminating the mission of defense of the
constitution and adding the missions of assisting during times of natural emergencies and
contributing to the growth of the nation via social projects. This modification in effect
legalized civic action which the military had been doing ever since the revolution. A final
modification in 1986 clarified the 1971 changes by "subdividing it into three separate
tasks: (1) providing aid to the civilian population in public emergencies, (2) performing
civic action and social works contributing to national progress, and (3) in the case of
natural disasters, helping in the maintenance of public order and providing support to the
affected population and its property."64
Today the Mexican military conducts operations under the rubric of four National
Defense Plans that loosely correspond to the missions outlined by the Organic Law. 65
National Defense Plan One (DN-1) requires the use of the army in defense of national
territory against the invasion from a foreign, hostile force. This plan correlates to the
Ley Organica del Ejercito y Armada Nacionales, 15 March 1926, as cited by Stephen J.
Wager, "The Mexican Military Approaches the 21 st Century: Coping with a New World
Order," in Donald E. Schulz and Edward J. Williams (editors), Mexico Faces the 21 st
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mission of defending the integrity and independence of the fatherland, as listed in the
Organic Law.
Due to Mexico's geographical placement between militarily insignificant
Guatemala to the south and the superpower United States to the north, this defense plan
does not receive much emphasis. Looking at the organizational structure of the army;
geographical zones as opposed to combat divisions, and the equipment, armored
personnel carriers as opposed to tanks; it is obvious that the Mexican army is more
concerned with protecting internal stability than with defending the nation from another
country's military. This may also be motivated by the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947, which joined twenty Latin American
countries with the United States in a formal mutual security alliance. This security
umbrella in essence guarantees that the United States will provide protection against
extra-hemispheric foreign invasion to all of its Western Hemisphere neighbors. 66 Although
not a signatory to the treaty, it is speculated that Mexico expects its neighbor to the north
to come to its defense if ever attacked by an external aggressor.
National Defense Plan Two (DN-2) requires the use of the military to defend the
nation against internal threats. Mexico is currently experiencing two ongoing insurgencies
by armed guerrillas that threaten its internal political stability. The first group is the
Zapatista Army, which only operates in Chiapas state, and the second group is the newer
Popular Revolutionary Army, which has staged attacks in numerous central and southern
66 G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System. 3 rd ed. (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 40.
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states. Both uprisings have caused the military to deploy away from their garrisons and
conduct sustained missions in an attempt to subdue the rebels.
To bring in the New Year of 1994, a rebel group of poor farmers armed with old
rifles and machetes from the state of Chiapas, calling themselves the Zapatista National
Liberation Army (occasionally referred to by their Spanish initials ofEZLN), declared war
on the government. They captured towns centered around and including the state capital
of San Cristobal de las Casas. Their masked leader, Sub-Commander Marcos, went public
with their "Declaration of War" to request agrarian reform and demand jobs, housing,
health care, and education for the impoverished indigenous Indians. The government
under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) responded with military force. The
army deployed with armored personnel carriers and infantry to force the guerrillas from
the towns they now occupied. However, the army also came under attack by the national
and foreign press for alleged human rights violations which included bombing civilian
areas, summary executions, and torture. 67 Thousands of anti-war protesters demonstrated
in Mexico City and twelve days later the government declared a cease fire in order to
initiate peace talks. Before the month ended, in an attempt to reduce public support for
the rebels, the government announced US$ 250 million in infrastructure projects to pacify
the people living in Chiapas.
What should be noted is the Zapatistas' willingness to lay down their weapons in
order to conduct peace talks. It is evident that they want to change politics and initiate
67
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reform, but they do not want to overthrow the government. For this willingness to work
with the current ruling government, Juan Linz would define the Zapatista movement as a
"semi-loyal opposition."
68 By the end of February 1994, the government envoy and the
Zapatista leaders had agreed to enact governmental reforms in Chiapas.
Unfortunately, a lasting agreement was not achieved. Rebel uprisings continued to
occur and the army maintained an occupation of Chiapas. Soon after assuming the
presidency on December 1, 1994, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000)
twice used the troops as a show of force, presumably to divert attention away from the
economic problems that he inherited from Salinas. In December 1994, hundreds of troops
rolled into the small town of San Andres Larrainzar, which the rebels had occupied a week
earlier.
69 Then in February 1995, after having suffered massive criticism in the world press
for the peso bail-out, President Zedillo, citing the discovery of two weapons caches, once
again sent the troops into the depths of the Lacandon jungle and surrounding hillsides.
68
Linz states that in order for a specific government to survive it must be considered
legitimate by its citizens. He states that legitimacy is a belief that the current political
system is the best type for that nation at that time and that the people are willing to accept
both the laws that they agree with and also those that they do not. Those citizens that
believe in this legitimacy and are willing to work within the system to install opposition
leaders are termed "loyal opposition." A "semi-loyal opposition" believes in the political
system but is willing to take actions beyond peaceful, lawful politics as a means to justify
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opposition" rejects the legitimacy of the current government and is willing to take any
actions it deems necessary to obtain its demands. See Juan L. Linz, The Breakdown of
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Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 16-33.
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Although the government chose to call this troop deployment a success, once
again under pressure from critics, the government was forced to recall the troops. While
in Chiapas, the army soldiers were tasked to perform public service tasks such as digging
ditches, distributing food, and giving haircuts and free medical check-ups. This was done
to enhance the popular support presumably developed by the infrastructure money
allocated by the government.
70 To this day the Zapatista crisis continues to linger, with
negotiations stalling and the continued presence of forty thousand army troops (one third
of the active force) deployed and patrolling in Chiapas.
The Mexican newspapers report daily on the rising significance of Chiapas. The
government refers to the state as a "hot spot" and military presence and building
continues. The state is now divided into three military zones and national defense
secretary General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre has visited the state numerous times in 1997
to witness the construction of four new military bases. In addition to the increased
presence, the army has also changed its tactics. It now travels by day and enters into small
communities to question and harass local peasants to obtain information leading to the
whereabouts of the insurgents. 71
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The Popular Revolutionary Army (known by their Spanish acronym, EPR),
emerged publicly in July 1996, in Tepetixtla, Guerrero, a small town thirty miles north of
Acapulco, by interrupting a ceremony commemorating the 1995 massacre of seventeen
peasants by Guerrero police.
72
In August 1996, two weeks before President Zedillo's
second State of the Union speech (15 September 1815), the EPR stunned the world by
conducting coordinated attacks on military and government targets simultaneously in five
different states. Unlike the Zapatistas, who present themselves as a band of poorly armed
Indians from the same state, the EPR forces are recruited from around the country and
appear to be well trained, organized, attired, and armed. It is rumored that they have
received their funding from such illegal activities as the April 1994 kidnapping of Alfredo
Harp Helu, the president of Banamex, the most powerful banking group in Mexico. 73
This kidnapping ransom alone netted US$ 30 million. 74 The EPR would be considered a
disloyal opposition by Juan Linz because they advocate the overthrowing of the current
PRI-led government and the installation of a socialist regime with a new constitution.
75
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The army sent a reported three thousand troops to hunt for the subversives and
occupy the towns that they had attacked. This amounts to a 500 percent increase in
military presence in some parts of Guerrero.
76
In a move considered to be extremely
controversial because of its constitutional implications, the army established roadblocks in
eleven of thirty-two states.
77
Since the Constitution prohibits roadblocks during peace
time, it could be argued that the government considered the country to be in a state of
war. Numerous journalists echo public concern that the country is becoming a militarized
state, given that troop deployments began in Chiapas in January 1994 to counter the
Zapatistas, and in numerous other states in August 1996 to counter the EPR, and still
continue up to today. The fact that in October 1996, troops were deployed outside of
their barracks in twenty-nine of the thirty-one states definitely increases their visibility to
the citizenry.
78
In the summer of 1997, the army started conducting social programs in
Guerrero to "mask" their increased presence and justify their daily patrols.
Another use of the military under the DN-2 mission of defending the nation against
internal threats would be the use of force to protect the political stability of the country. It
can be argued that the use of the military for social control in times of political crisis
serves the purpose of maintaining the status quo, which is synonymous with the PRI
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party's entrenchment, particularly in a situation when there is a party-state identity. An
early example of the army acting to maintain the status quo of the entrenched PRI party
occurred during the 1952 presidential elections. The first non-military president, Miguel
Aleman Valdes (1946-1952), had selected Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) to succeed
him, and Ruiz naturally won. General Miguel Henriquez Guzman, the opposition
candidate who had founded the Federated Party of the Mexican People (FPPM), lost the
election. Partisans of the FPPM incited a riot in Mexico City and army troops were forced
to subdue the rioters. 79
In 1967 and 1968, students were protesting around the world against the cold war
and for civil liberties. Mexican students and workers did the same throughout the summer
of 1968, sometimes with sporadic violence, and they were often subdued with harsh
governmental intervention. In October 1968, over ten thousand Mexican army troops and
police forces were called in to subdue approximately six thousand student protesters.
Unidentified snipers fired upon the governmental forces and the army opened fire on the
unarmed student demonstrators in the Plaza de Tlatelolco, killing between twenty-five and
five hundred people according to different estimates. The world press, in Mexico City for
the upcoming 1968 Olympics, watched in horror. 80
79
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Another example occurred in March 1990 when armored vehicles filled with army
troops rolled into Michoacan state to evict PRD opposition party protesters who had
occupied seventeen city halls since local elections had been held three months earlier. The
protesters from the leftist party claimed that the elections had been fraudulent in both
Michoacan and in neighboring Guerrero state. Seven people were killed in Guerrero when
local police evicted protesters who were also occupying city halls. The government
decided to use federal troops in place of the police in Michoacan to avoid a repeat of the
Guerrero bloodbath. Although the government did not openly admit to using soldiers
during this episode, they were seen on national television. Having the army intervene in
political disputes is a touchy subject for the Mexican government and people. Interior
Minister Fernando Gutierrez Barrios publicly stated that the '"federal presence' in
Michoacan had been 'reinforced' to avoid violence on the part of the PRD " 81
Armored personnel carriers once again rolled into Michoacan two years later, this
time prior to the election. The July 1992 gubernatorial election was seen as a test for the
PRI, so troops were sent to ensure a "fair" election was held in order to dispel any
subsequent protests. The soldiers provided protection for election officials and polling
places. It is interesting to note that hundreds of international election observers, including
members from the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, were allowed to witness the polls
01
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and that fraud was still reported, even though the PRI was expected to win without any
electoral manipulation.
82
Army troops were put on full alert and mobilized to the capital city once again for
an election; this time the 1994 presidential election. It was widely believed throughout
Mexico that the presidential election held in 1988 was fraudulent. In 1988, the PRI-
dominated Federal Election Commission (FEC) stated that the PRI candidate, Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, won with 50.36 percent of the vote while running against Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD: Partido de la Revolution Democrdticd) candidate
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. However, during that election, army troops blocked opposition
leaders from observing while the FEC secretly counted the ballots for three hours.
Independent exit polls indicated that Cardenas obtained more votes than did Salinas. 83 So
in 1994, when Cardenas was running again, this time against PRI candidate Ernesto
Zedillo, soldiers beefed up security at Mexico City's national airport.
As a result of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas state, the government reportedly
began to purchase new equipment. This included new rifles, anti-riot vehicles, Black
Hawk helicopters, and Humvees made in the United States. Even though the government
claimed that these purchases were part of an overall military modernization plan, the true
purpose for this equipment acquisition was to prepare for the anticipated unrest in the
82
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wake of the 1994 elections. 84 This fear of unrest originated from threats made directly by
PRD candidate Cardenas. He announced prior to the election that "if there is fraud, we
will not stand idly by. We will not return to our homes. Nobody will be able to oppose
the people's mobilization. And the immediate civic resistance that will erupt to force them
to respect the law."
85
Army troops were used again later in 1994 to protect the oil and natural gas fields
in the southern state of Tabasco against attack. The PRD political party claimed that the
November 1994 local elections in Tabasco and Veracruz states, as well as the presidential
elections held in August 1994, were fraudulent. The PRD threatened to disrupt oil
production if the local election results weren't annulled. Tabasco and Veracruz not only
provide the majority of Mexico's oil and natural gas, but the country's main refineries are
also located there.
86
National Defense Plan Three (DN-3) provides for the army's assistance during
times of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods. Under this plan,
the army also conducts civic action which it terms "social work." The national army has
been conducting this type ofwork since the revolution. President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-
1940) envisioned the military as a nation building force. He considered this mission a
84
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means to keep the officers occupied and therefore unable to participate in politics.
Cardenas also planned to use the military scattered around the country as an opportunity
to exert governmental control over the outlying states. 87
The civic action conducted by the military has evolved since the revolution.
Following the devastation caused by the revolution, the army repaired railroad and
telegraph lines and constructed roads. After World War II, the military helped with the
construction of regional airports. The army has also been the principal force since the
1930s in reforestation and fighting forest fires.
On the social side of civic action, the army has been involved with literacy training
since the revolution and particularly during the 1940s and 1950s. The military has also
provided medical and dental care to the population in the countryside and has taken care
of livestock. In particular, it was the military that took control during the cattle hoof and
mouth epidemic during the late 1940s. To prevent future plagues, the military began
vaccinating cattle.
National Defense Plan Four (DN-4) allows the Mexican military to fight the war
on drugs and will be addressed separately in the next section of this chapter. Here it
should be noted that the military's participation in the drug war is supported by doctrine
and is also adding to the internal use of the military.
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C. THE DRUG WAR
Mexico's increased militarization of the "drug war" closely parallels that of the
United States. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, a forerunner to today's
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), first began operations in Mexico in 1961. 88 Although
not officially acknowledged by the Mexican government, the two countries worked
surprisingly well together for over two decades before the cooperation became publicized.
It wasn't until the mid-1980s, when U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) stated
that links existed between Latin American drug traffickers and communist guerrilla
insurgents, that the "drug war" become a topic for public debate. "The President called
trafficking and terrorism "twin evils," and claimed they represented 'the most insidious
and dangerous threats to the hemisphere today.'"89
The 1986 U.S. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-221 transformed
international drug trafficking from a purely law enforcement issue into an official national
security threat. This enabled the Reagan administration to include all cabinet secretaries
and their respective departments, as well as the CIA and the National Security Agency, in
an unified effort to combat the flow of drugs. Reagan's war on drugs included using the
military to plan large scale operations, collect intelligence, and work with foreign
militaries. To encourage foreign governments to turn the drug threat into a "war" in their
18
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respective countries, NSDD-221 quoted a CIA National Intelligence Estimate which
stated, "Powerful trafficking organizations can corrupt and undermine political, social, and
security institutions within democratic nations."90 The United States chose to attack the
drug problem as a supply and not as a demand problem, which provided the impetus to
grant military aid in the means of arms and training to foreign militaries in Latin America.
Also in 1986, the U.S. Congress passed legislation requiring the President to officially
certify foreign governments' cooperation in combating the international drug war.
The South Florida Task Force, which had been created in 1981, produced a
problem which had devastating affects on Mexico. It successfully interdicted the flow of
drugs through the Caribbean Sea, which prompted South American drug cartels to begin
shipping drugs through Mexico. Today, 70 percent of all drugs entering the United States
come through Mexico. 91
Mexico, which had been historically against military cooperation with the United
States and had rarely publicly discussed national security concerns, eventually accepted
President Reagan's fear of the drug threat. In 1987, President Miguel de la Madrid
became the first Mexican president to acknowledge the drug issue as a national security
threat.
92 Even more significant is the rewording of the five year National Development
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Plan (NDP) under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). NDP 1983-88 stated
that due to the changing world "the armed forces have been transformed so that their
strictly military original role has been recast to include growing activities related to the
well-being of the community," and NDP 1989-94 specifically included using the military to
counter drug trafficking.
93
During the presidencies of both Salinas and Zedillo, the army greatly increased its
role and missions to absorb much of the drug enforcement responsibilities from other law
enforcement agencies. The NDP and DN-4 has allowed the Mexican military to legally
accept these new missions.
The Mexican army has received 73 UH-1H helicopters and 4 C-26 Fairchild
observation aircraft from the United States through the Military Foreign Assistance
(MFA) program to increase their ability to eradicate drug producing fields and to pursue
drug traffickers. Of the US$ 112 million worth of military equipment and training that
President Clinton allocated to Latin American countries in 1996, Mexico received US$ 37
million.
94
"Mexico is carrying out its war on drugs literally - with its army...Many critics
worry about the implications."
95 The army has been tasked to eradicate poppy fields and
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marijuana crops. When asked on CNN why the army was going beyond its original
mission of eradication by increasing its role in interdiction, Colonel Alajandro Daniels, the
army officer in charge of interdicting drug traffickers in Guerrero state, replied: "We know
these missions are supposed to be handled by the federal police, but our constitution says
that when the police is incompetent for a task that affects national security, the president
can use the armed forces."96 The army is currently devoting up to fifteen thousand troops
(or 12 percent of its total force) to combat drugs. The Autonomous University of Mexico
conducted a study which indicated that drug cartels operating in the country take in some
US$ 15 billion to US$ 30 billion a year, of which nearly US$ 0.8 billion is invested in
bribes to authorities.
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After the state's assistant attorney-general was arrested in April
1994, the governor of Baja California, home to the powerful Tijuana drug cartel, admitted
that state, federal, and judicial officials in his state were deeply involved in the narcotics
trade.
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Due to the prevalent problem of corruption, Army troops are now filling vacancies
in law enforcement agencies. Most special drug units in the capital city and Tijuana are
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U.S. border states that see the majority of trafficking." In 1996, nearly the entire drug
enforcement apparatus came under military control. Some eight hundred individuals
within the structure of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR),
including many members of the Federal Judicial Police (PJF), were purged for suspicion of
corruption and links to drug cartels.
100
Another five hundred have been purged during the
first three months of 1997.
President Zedillo appointed Jorge Madrazo Cuellar as Attorney General in
December 1996, who then appointed three army generals to head the PJF, the Center for
the Planning of Drug Control and the National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD). The
three generals were asked to purge their organizations of corrupt personnel, replace them
with military officers, and then train them to create elite units to combat organized crime.
They were also told to create a National Intelligence Program to share information on
known drug traffickers. 101
General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, who had been appointed to head the INCD in
early December 1996, lasted only eight weeks in his new position as Mexico's drug czar.
He was arrested on charges of corruption and national treason for allegedly accepting
19
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millions of dollars in bribes from one of the world's most notorious drug barons. 102
Mexico appointed a civilian lawyer, Mariano Herran Salvatti, to be the new commissioner
of the INCD and Attorney General Madrazo implemented new screening procedures for
all PGR personnel and assigned military officers, which include polygraph, medical, and
psychological testing. The INCD was abolished in April 1997 by presidential decree and
replaced by the Special Prosecutor's Office to Deal with Crimes against Health. As the
arrest of General Gutierrez indicates, merely replacing corrupt civilians with army
personnel does not eradicate the root problem of corruption.
D. POLITICAL CORRUPTION
In referring to the use of the military during times of political crisis, it can be
argued that their actions serve one of two purposes: either to maintain the status quo,
which we have already seen, or to fill a power vacuum, that is a position which is vacant
due to the perception that it was illegitimately held or corrupted.
Overall, 1994 was a year of chaos, uprisings, economic crisis, and rising crime for
Mexico. The Zapatistas attacked on New Year's day and the following weeks were
consumed by political negotiations and the need to combat the economic fallout. Then on
24 March, a lone gunman with a .38 caliber pistol walked up to the PRI presidential
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, while he was campaigning in a shantytown outside
102
General Gutierrez has been charged with accepting money, cars and homes over a
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Tijuana, and shot him once in the head while he was standing and then again in the
stomach after he fell to the ground. The shooter, Mario Aburto, was immediately
captured, and as he was being pulled through the enraged crowd, he shouted "I have
saved Mexico." 103 This represents the mixed feelings of Mexicans about the ruling party.
Colosio advocated change and reform. The old PRI hard-liners, or dinosaurios, refused
to accept change and were rumored to have dictated his assassination. Another rumor
was that the drug cartels, which may have been linked to the PRI, ordered his killing. 104
One month later, Alberto Harp Helu, the president of the most powerful banking
group in Mexico, Banamex, was kidnapped. This became significant later when it was
revealed that this incident provided the funding for the EPR insurgency. Six weeks later
another high profile kidnapping rocked the Mexican press, this time the son of a large,
corporate executive. Then on 28 September, the general secretary of the PRI party and
former governor of Guerrero, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, was assassinated in Mexico
City.
The murder of Ruiz became significant because it began to unravel the puzzle that
surrounds the relationship between the PRI party, the government, and the military. There
is still great uncertainty surrounding Ruiz's murder. It is not known whether the murder
was politically motivated or ordered by drug barons as a warning to Mexican officials
103 Tom Masland, "Murder in Mexico," Newsweek. 4 April 1994. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS.
Library: News. File: Mags. 12 August 1996.
Noel Lorthiois, "Mexico's Ruling Party Says Good Riddance to Bad Year," Agence
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responsible for the government's anti-drug efforts. The mere fact that anyone would dare
murder such a high ranking ruling party official indicates just how unstable the situation in
Mexico had become. The murder raises questions about the pervasive drug trade in
Mexico and the involvement of corrupt Mexican officials, including members of the PRI,
as well as the Mexican military, and police. 105
The Mexican military has become involved in these scandals for two different, but
somewhat similar reasons. First, DN-4, the newest National Defense Plan, mandates their
involvement in the war on drugs. Second, they have taken over law enforcement
functions from various local police units. This is due to police inability to be effective and
more directly is a result of the police corruption and infiltration by the drug cartels. The
result is that the army is responsible for tracking down criminals and drug traffickers,
many of whom are reputed to be linked to the PRI political party, who are the civilian
commanders of the military.
President Zedillo appointed Ruiz's brother, Mario Ruiz Massieu, as Deputy
Attorney General and placed him in charge of investigating his brother's assassination.
Mario Ruiz, however, eventually resigned his post, alleging that high officials within the
PRI and government were interfering with his investigation. Rumors abound in Mexico
that he was getting too close to the truth behind the connections between the party and the
105
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drug cartels. He also was making public comments about the connection of his brother's
murder to the murder of Colosio.
All of this imparts the feeling that the PRI-led government has lost its ability to co-
opt and absorb opposition, both internal and external to the party. Sometimes it is hard to
distinguish the difference, but it is at these occurrences where military intervention and
assignment to new roles and missions could be interpreted as filling a position created due
to a power vacuum. Although it currently appears unlikely that the military would be
willing to intervene overtly in the country's political affairs to rule directly, it is apparent
that they are being tasked to fulfill new roles.
President Zedillo has not been timid to reform what he perceives to be flawed. He
acted to correct the country's economic problems, and has also been tinkering with the
law enforcement issues. In October 1995, he proposed a new national security system for
police-military control. He received PRI backing in congress to create a new security
apparatus where the military would have special powers. The proposal placed all existing
law enforcement agencies and the armed forces under the combined coordination of the
executive branch.
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This increased use of the military has not gone unnoticed by the opposition.
Leaders of the PRD party have complained that President Zedillo has expanded the role of
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the military to combat common crime and political disturbances in southern states such as
Chiapas and Tabasco. 108 However, this did not stop the president from praising the army
during its 83 rd anniversary celebration in stating that "In these times of intense economic,
political and social changes, the Mexican army has maintained itself as a solid pillar of
legality."
109 He went on to thank them for their loyalty and for fulfilling their
"institutional" mission.
Four months later, in June 1996, President Zedillo declared crime the biggest
problem facing the capital city and appointed a top army general to head the police force.
Following the economic crisis of late 1994 and the following spring, the crime rate soared
over 35 percent in Mexico City. Then in May 1996, riot police violently subdued striking
school teachers as they were marching. This prompted the firing of the police chief and
the appointment of army General Enrique Salgado Cordero as his replacement. In public
opinion polls conducted in the capital, the Mexican army receives a higher level of respect
than does the police force, which is considered to be filled with corruption. 110
Soon after being appointed as head of the Public Security Secretariat (SSP) for the
Federal District (his new title), General Salgado fired key civilian personnel and appointed
another twenty-five generals and colonels to fill their positions on the capital's police
108
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force. Nine months later, the number of military officers in key positions had grown to
ninety-two and the police force was augmented with three thousand combat soldiers to
help patrol the streets. Another program instituted by General Salgado under President
Zedillo's encouragement is the retraining of police officers.
111
This training program sends civilian police officers to Military Field Number One,
a base just outside the capital, where they undergo three months of extensive military
training before being sent back to their posts. While all personnel from a given police
district undergo this training, additional military combat soldiers assume their duties on the
capital's streets. Nearly six thousand police officers have been trained so far in 1997,
which means that just as many soldiers have been required to fill their vacant posts. 112
Opinion on this militarization of Mexico City's police force varies. Critics from
the two opposition political parties call President Zedillo's program unconstitutional.
However, the Mexican Supreme Court approved the use of the military personnel to help
combat crime. Tulane professor Roderic Camp, a leading expert on Mexican politics and
the military, warns Mexican leaders that they are "sending a message to your citizens that
civilian leadership is incapable of resolving these problems, and needs the military. It
111 Alfredo Joyner and Jorge Arturo Hidalgo, "General Defends Military's Security Role,"
Mexico City Reforma . 1 April 1997. Online. FBIS #97L10101A. 6 November 1997. Also
Bertha Teresa Ramirez and Mirian Posada, "Mexico: Talks on Military Role in Capital
Planned," La Jornada. 9 July 1997. Online. FBIS-LAT-97-198. 6 November 1997.
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won't take long before the military is just as compromised as the police" 113 In contrast,
both citizens and business owners prefer the use of the soldiers because they perceive this
cuts down on crime in the city.
There are numerous examples of the resort to military officers to fill key civilian
posts throughout Mexico. An army general commands the police in the southern state of
Tabasco, which is troubled by PRD protesters that threaten disruption of the oil industry.
Two other army generals took over the administration of two airpoits outside of Mexico
City in January 1997 when it was discovered that the airports were being used to transship
illicit narcotics. In April 1997, an army Lieutenant Colonel assumed command of the
Federal Judicial Police office at Nuevo Leon in the state of Monterrey and militarized the
post by using one hundred soldiers to augment the fifty civilian officers.
Elsewhere in the country, military units conduct duties normally assigned to
civilians. On the northern border in Ciudad Juarez, a key crossing point of cocaine and
other illegal drugs entering the United States, soldiers wear civilian clothes while
conducting anti-narcotics efforts for the federal police. The military also conducts anti-
drug operations in Guadalajara, Mexico's second largest city and home to many of the
country's smuggling gangs. 114
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It is evident that the government of Mexico is losing confidence in the local police
personnel and public administrators and utilizes army officers and troops to fill these
vacated positions. Unfortunately, this is no longer a combination of isolated occurrences.
The militarization of Mexico is an ongoing trend that is beginning to pervade all segments
of its civil society and may have a significant and negative impact on the democratic
reforms that President Zedillo is also attempting to implement. This in turn may create





The previous chapter discussed the independent variables of internally-focused
doctrine, the drug war, and corruption and presented substantive evidence to prove that all
three are contributing to the increased use of the military in Mexico, resulting in the
militarization of its society. In addition to this militarization one can observe two
simultaneous phenomena: President Zedillo's attempts at democratic liberalization and the
loss of hegemony by the ruling PRI political party. The introductory chapter speculated
about the combination of this increased militarization with these future political
uncertainties. This chapter will analyze the results of the most recent elections held in
Mexico and speculate on future election results. It will also speculate on the future state
of civil-military relations in Mexico and discuss the national security implications and
related policy recommendations for the United States.
B. ELECTION RESULTS
Chapter III of this thesis discussed how the revolutionary generals turned
politicians created the political party that today is the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI: Partido Revolucionario Institutional). That party maintained absolute hegemonic
control of the country for six decades. Opposition parties have always existed in Mexico
with the PRI's qualified support to provide a resemblance of electoral competition.
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However, beginning in 1989, when the right-of-center National Action Party (PAN:
Partido de Action National) won the gubernatorial election of Baja California, the
opposition parties have been gaining public support and winning elections.
The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD: Partido de la Revolution
Democrdtica) was formed by combining numerous fractional left-of-center parties that
had competed for seventy years. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, son of President Lazaro
Cardenas (1934-1940), became the PRD national candidate. He had run against Carlos
Salinas de Gortari (president: 1988-1994) and lost by the closest margin in PRI history.
As discussed in Chapter IV, many people in and outside Mexico believe that Cardenas
actually won the election but that Salinas assumed the office due to PRI supported fraud.
Cardenas lost to President Zedillo in 1994 in a reportedly fairer election.
The 6 July 1997, election provides what most pundits agree is the biggest
indication of how democratic reforms in Mexico will proceed in the future. The mayor of
the capital city has always been a presidential appointee and therefore a staunch PRI
supporter. In July 1997, the position of mayor was put to a general election for the first
time in history. Cardenas, running on the PRD ticket, won the mayoral position by a two-
to-one margin over his PRI opponent. This places him directly in charge of over nine
million city inhabitants and indirectly in charge of nearly twenty-two million people who
reside in the capital city suburbs. More important, this electoral victory provides Cardenas
with a bully-pulpit from which to influence the largest concentrated block of voters in the
country in time for the next presidential election to be held in July 2000.
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There were also six gubernatorial elections held in July 1997, with the PRI
maintaining control of four and the PAN winning two. It is estimated that well over 70
percent of Mexico's population is now under the leadership and political control of either
the PRD or PAN at the state and local level. This has proved to have a profound
influence upon voters when they go to the polls to select their national leaders.
A striking example of this increasing political pluralism in Mexico is the loss of
PRI hegemony in their lower house of congress, the House of Deputies. The house has
five hundred seats of which three hundred are filled by direct election and the remaining
200 are allocated by proportional representation. A political party must obtain at least 42
percent of the vote to claim an absolute majority. For the first time in sixty-eight years,
the PRI failed to win more than 40 percent of the vote. The PAN and the PRD also failed
to win a majority, but their combined 52 percent of the vote and four week's worth of
debate produced for the first time in history a Speaker of the House coming from the PRI
opposition.
The PRI obtained 39 percent of the congressional vote, which combined with their
proportional allotment gave them 239 seats (48 percent) in the House of Deputies. The
PAN and PRD each won roughly 26 percent of the congressional vote. Due to
proportional allotment in different districts, the PRD ended up with 125 seats, the PAN
with 121 seats and the remaining fifteen seats went to the Labor and Green parties. 115
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One deputy elected as a PRI candidate has since shifted allegiance to the PRD.
Opposition deputies debated for four weeks and finally reached a quorum, selecting
Porfirio Munoz Ledo from the PRD to be the speaker of the house. This enabled him to
present a rebuttal to the President's State of the Nation speech on 1 September 1997. It
was the first time in history that an opposition member was allowed to do so. 116
In the Senate, the upper house of congress, thirty-two of 128 seats were up for a
vote in July 1997. The PRI maintains a seventy-seven to fifty-one majority which when
combined with the lower house gives the PRI an overall advantage of 3 1 5 to 313. This
loss of PRI hegemony leads to the assumption that there will be more compromise and
negotiation, if not open debate and confrontation in the legislative process.
An even newer process for the legislation is the questioning of Cabinet secretaries
on their policies. This is an attempt to emulate the power of the United States congress
and a move designed to raise the image of the Mexican congress from one of a rubber-
stamp organization to one that wields the political power of the represented people.
Attorney General Jorge Madrazo was the first Cabinet member questioned. He spent five
hours explaining the policies of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR).
Another obvious concern for both the President's cabinet and the military is that the
House of Deputies has the "power of the purse." In the future, it can be expected that the
Mexican congress will pattern itself more after the United States and assume both
116 Anita Snow, "Mexico Congress: A Sign of Change," AOL News Service . 2 August
1997. Online. America Online. 2 August 1997.
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investigative and policy approval procedures. This will certainly make politics in Mexico
less predictable in the future.
What does this mean for the future of democratic reforms in Mexico? Merely
looking at the results of the most recent election, the first ever mayoral race of the capital
and the House of Deputies, one could be reasonably over-optimistic. The PRI has lost its
congressional hegemony and now the opposition has the opportunity to question all that
the ruling PRI president does. The lower house of congress controls the budget and can
allocate funds to dictate their policy priorities. And finally, the PRD mayor-elect of
Mexico City is sitting in the best seat available from which to run for president in the year
2000.
Now a word of caution. Although the Mexican constitution prescribes a
government divided into three branches with balancing powers, the system has always
been one where the president wields all the power. Most Latin American constitutions
have these provisions, copied from the United States, but in practice the president has
always been very powerful. And the president is still from the PRI. Even though the
House of Deputies is controlled by the opposition, the Senate is still controlled by the
ruling party. This is the first time in history that the different houses of congress have
been controlled by different parties and no one yet knows how the power play will unfold.
It would be reckless to predict that Cuauhtemoc Cardenas will be the Mexican
president in 2000, or that any opposition candidate will win the presidential election. It is
too soon to reasonably speculate on that outcome. The Mexican system of patronage and
the influence of the PRI may be enough to maintain the presidency even when faced with a
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vocal opposition in congress. However, based on worldwide democratic trends, the
influence of political watch groups such as the Carter Center, and the increasing voice of
the Mexican citizen, one can predict that democratic liberalization and political reform will
continue to prosper in Mexico.
C. FUTURE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Political reform does not necessarily entail reduced use of the military in Mexican
society. Mexico has always been militarized. This is due to the fact that both the PRI and
the military were formed by revolutionary generals. The Mexican government has always
harnessed the manpower and organizational skills of the military to implement programs
away from the urban capital and to control unruly segments of the society. What is new
today is the extent of militarization ofMexican society.
What I hope is clear from reading this thesis is an awareness of the extent of that
increasing militarization. Today, the military in Mexico is being tasked to conduct
missions and fulfill roles that are entirely new and that pervade all segments of civil
society. It is comparatively much easier to increase gradually the use of the military than it
is to suddenly stop using the military in non-traditional roles. The fear then is what will
happen to civil-military relations during this democratic reform process? There are two
possible and contradictory outcomes.
First, the pessimistic view. The military is closely tied to the PRI-led government
and has even been called the "armed wing of the party." Many observers of the Mexican
political scene worry that the military will be forced to or even voluntarily intervene in
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politics to ensure the sustained hegemony of the PRI government. 117 This could be a
result of the Mexican military officer being simultaneously professional and politicized, as
Alfred Stepan explains in his theory of the "new professional." 118 Increased public
violence and lawlessness could therefore prompt the interventionist tendencies of the
military. Finally, both force structure and military budget have increased during the past
decade under the PRI-led government and the military may not be willing to suffer the
consequences of a future left-leaning PRD government.
To counter with the optimistic viewpoint, I believe the military will remain neutral
in politics and will not intervene on the behalf of any particular political party. Evidence
to support this assumption includes the large numbers of generals and admirals who have
publicly shifted allegiance from the PRI to the PRD this past election year. 119 This is also
based upon the military's loyalty to the constitution and their dislike for past interventions,
such as the 1968 Plaza de Tlatelolco fiasco. Senior military officers have publicly voiced
this loyalty several times during the past few years. National Defense Secretary General
Cervantes specifically stated after this year's elections that the military's loyalty would
117 Two Mexican experts, Tulane University Professor Roderic Camp and Georgetown
University Professor John Bailey, are interviewed in Mark Fineman, "Analysts Troubled
by Growing Military Presence," The News . 1 1 February 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS.
Library: News. File: Allwld. 26 August 1997.
118 Stepan, 1973, op. cit .
119 Ten retired flag officers and one active duty naval officer publicly shifted their party
affiliation. See "Mexican Ex-military Officers Join Opposition," Reuter Textline ,
14 January 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Curnews. 26 August 1997.
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nourish the democratic process. However, the fact that the military refuses to intervene in
politics does not automatically indicate that Mexico will become demilitarized.
Unfortunately, using the military in civil society has become a necessary evil.
When faced with the specter of lawlessness, violent crime, and corruption, the Mexican
public and business leaders overwhelmingly support the use of the military in non-
traditional roles and even as a substitute for civilian leadership. Therefore, to facilitate the
demilitarization of Mexico, the root causes of the problem need to be corrected. This of
course is much easier said than done.
The overriding problem is one of orientation and doctrine. According to the
Organic Law and the National Defense Plans, Mexico's military is primarily directed
towards internal political threats, such as combating the drug war and assisting in nation
building. To demilitarize, Mexico will need to reorient the military in accordance with
Huntington's theory of objective civilian control. This will entail assigning external
defense missions to the military and allowing the military to train for that mission.
To demilitarize Mexican society, the government must force the military to
relinquish the numerous law enforcement positions it occupies. The government must also
create or reorganize civilian law enforcement and judicial agencies. This will be no easy
task considering that many criminal prosecutors are incompetent and that 30 percent of
the judges are estimated to be in the pockets of the narco-traffickers. For justice to
prevail in Mexico, the government will have to recivilianize the police forces and also
implement meaningful judicial reform. Mayor-elect Cardenas is already making progress
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by requesting the resignation of all military officers serving in a law enforcement billet in
the capital city.
The disbandment of the National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD) and its
replacement with the Special Prosecutor's Office to Deal with Crimes against Health is a
step forward in the demilitariztion of the "drug war." Mexico must not only remove the
military from the process, but must also de-emphasize the idea that it is a "war" Instead,
the emphasis must be placed on law enforcement, public health, and education. The
United States would also benefit from this paradigm shift.
I would now like to address the issues raised in the introduction of this thesis. It is
undeniable that the visibility of the military in Mexico has drastically increased during the
past few years and that this increased visibility translates into the militarization of the
society. However, this increased visibility does not necessarily translate into increased
military influence in the Mexican political system. It would also be erroneous to argue
that the militarization of politics will have a de-stabilizing influence on the Mexican
political system. Political instability in Mexico is a result of a combination of many
factors: the two ongoing guerrilla insurgencies, the corruption and violence associated
with narco-traffickers, the unpredictable economy, social inequality, and the uncertainty
caused by recent democratic reforms. It is this political instability and its root causes that
are forcing the Mexican government to militarize the society. Mexico must find a non-
military solution to its problems. The United States may be able to help. In the final
section of this thesis, I propose some policy recommendations to assist the demilitarization
ofMexico.
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D. SUGGESTED POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES
Before he left his post in July 1997, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, James Jones,
stated that the number one problem in Mexico was the social and economic inequality. He
feared that this inequality would breed serious problems and that they would spill over into
the United States. Mexican professor Lorenzo Meyer commenting on the ambassador's
thoughts, argues that the United States has a history of backing the PRI political party but
that the PRI is no longer providing political and economic stability for its citizens. 120
Therefore, the United States must do two things to prevent this spillover of problems. It
must support the democratic reform in Mexico without favoring any one particular
political party and it must continue to promote economic growth as it does with the North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).
To help Mexico demilitarize the "drug war," the United States must also de-
emphasize the "war" aspect of the problem. We must remember that the root cause of the
problem is the over abundant demand from the United States consumer and not the supply
that transships through Mexico. The U.S. government must also discontinue the
certification process. This process only sends mixed signals to Mexico, spreads hate and
discontent within our own government and between our government and Mexico's. We
must refrain from asking the Mexicans to do what we are not willing to do ourselves.
United States "drug czar," General Barry McCaffrey, opposed presidential
candidate Robert Dole's call for increased U.S. Army participation in the anti-drug effort.
120 Lorenzo Meyer, "Dollars, the PRI, and the Ambasador," Reforma
. 12 December 1996.
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According to General McCaffrey, the increased U.S. military involvement in the "drug
war" would have serious national security and civil-military relations implications for the
United States. However, on numerous occasions, McCaffrey has encouraged the use of
the Mexican military to stem the flow of illicit narcotics and praised them as one of the
most efficient anti-drug units in the world. We cannot promote such a double standard. If
it is wrong for the U.S. military to participate in anti-drug efforts, then it is also wrong for
the Mexican military to do so. Rather than sending military aid to Mexico to help
militarize the "drug war," the U.S. government would be better off sending aid for
criminal justice reform in order to help train civilian law enforcement officers on how to
capture and prosecute narco-traffickers.
Finally, to help professionalize the Mexican military, it is correct to encourage joint
military training in the future. This will help to reorient the Mexican military away from
internal missions towards more traditional external missions. However, the U.S.
government should proceed with caution. The Mexican public protested fiercely when
first notified of these proposed military exchanges. The U.S. government and military
must take their time, present to their counterparts the merits and potential benefits of the
joint operations, and then allow the Mexican government to educate its citizens and
change public opinion. Mexico and the United States are forever locked into a complex
interdependent relationship. Whatever we do to assist each other will reap benefits in both
countries.
121 Carlos Montemayor, "One More Mission for the Armed Forces?" La Jornada.
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